Prelude
Two days before the LUSI eruption began, the south coast of Java was hit by an earthquake of magnitude 6.3. Although somewhat eclipsed by subsequent news, this earthquake killed many more people than the subsequent eruption – over 6200 – and put over 1.5 million people on the streets. From the beginning opinion has been divided on the role of this catastrophe in subsequent events. To what extent might it have been responsible for the eruption? This is a question in which the operators of the nearby well, Banjar-Panji 1 (BP1), PT Lapindo Brantas, took a keen interest (see box).
With legal proceedings and a full-blown media campaign by the operator going on in the background, geologists’ efforts to understand the nature of the beast that had been unleashed on the citizens of Sidoarjo have been closely watched as they piece together the sequence of events leading up to the eruption of 29 March 2006. Early reports favoured the “drilling accident” scenario; but the “earthquake-trigger” hypothesis has not lacked geological supporters.
One thing everyone agrees on however is this. Whatever caused it, LUSI is bigger and nastier than any other mud volcano in the region, and interestingly combines elements of both mud volcano - and geyser. So what exactly do we know about the series of unfortunate events that led to this disaster?
Overpressure
LUSI is a “pioneer mud volcano” because none was previously known in the immediate area. This is rather worrying because many geologists believe that once established, a mud volcano system can become self-perpetuating – the subsidence of the overburden causing cracks to open up, which in turn develop into new mud volcanoes.
LUSI lies in the East Java Basin, an inverted extensional basin made up of a number of east-west striking half graben that developed in the Paleogene and which later underwent compression in the Miocene to Recent. Since the Oligocene, thick piles of shallow marine limestones and marine muds were laid down, some of which are overpressured. These were folded into gentle anticlines and synclines, with normal and reverse faults cutting the anticline crests.
One of these crests was the target of the Banjar-Panji 1 well, which was prospecting for natural gas in Kujung Formation carbonates (Oligo-Miocene). Passing first through Pleistocene Pucangan and Kabuh Formations, BP1 then entered ~1km of overpressured muds (Kalibeng Formation, also Pleistocene); a further 1.3km of interbedded sands and muds. What happened next is disputed, but proponents of the human-trigger theory believe the well penetrated the overpressured limestones of the Kujung Formation. At this point, all are agreed, no casing lined the lower 1743 metres of the well, allowing free communication between the borehole’s fluids and not only the overpressured limestone, but also the entire thickness of interbedded sands and mud above it, and the overpressured muds above them.
It is known from nearby wells that the pore pressure in the Kujung Formation limestone aquifer is 48 Megapascals (MPa) (6970psi) at 2597m. In BP1, pore pressures 700m above the limestone are known to have been 38MPa (5500psi). Professor Richard Davies (Durham University), believes that at the depth that the well pierced the Kujung Formation, the overpressure would have amounted to 21 MPa. Davies and co-workers went on the record in January last year1 proposing that the penetration of the overpressured Kujung Formation caused a “kick” in the well, as the limestone’s pore fluids forced their way into the drilling mud, finding a readymade conduit between the highly overpressured pore waters in the aquifer and the unconsolidated muds lying above. Recent (unpublished) studies suggest that this kick occurred after a slight delay, as the string was being pulled.
Thereafter, Davies et al. believe, the route to surface veered away from the well itself and passed through the surrounding overburden. High pore pressures are known to cause natural hydraulic fracturing whenever they exceed the rock’s fracture strength. This is highly likely when uncased wells pass through weak, poorly consolidated sediments, and probably lucky for the workers on the rig; as Davies and others believe that this prevented a straightforward blow-out. Such an event could well have resulted in every oilman’s worst nightmare - “cratering”, when the rig gets blown off the face of the Earth.
Richard Davies doesn’t think the earthquake could have been directly responsible for LUSI. “No other mud volcano eruptions were reported at the same time” he says. “The quake preceded LUSI’s eruption by two days, and when the earthquake struck nothing happened in the well. The well kick occurred the following day while they were puling the drill bit out of the hole.” On graphs of distance from epicentre versus earthquake magnitude, LUSI plots way above the line below which mud volcanoes are affected by seismic activity. Moreover, earthquake-induced liquefaction is seen in sands but less often in muds, which are more cohesive. The quake could have weakened the uncased well, but Davies thinks it would have been too big a coincidence for this to have also caused a fracture to surface 200m away, and provide the network of cracks extending down into the overpressured limestone that he believes would be needed to produce the eruption.
The combination of unconsolidated mud above an overpressured aquifer is a potent one. The aquifer provides a ready pressure-drive for the system, while the overlying sediment, easily entrained, can contribute an almost limitless supply of solids. Davies likens the system to the (mercifully much cooler and smaller-scale) mud springs at Wootton Bassett, near Swindon, England. Here, the pressured waters derive from Corallian limestones and entrain the Ampthill Clay on their way to the surface; but this connection is of course natural and did not require the intervention of either earthquakes or drillers to bring them together.